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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: Whether the trial court exercised reasonable control over the order and 
mode of testimony. 
Standard of Review: "Rule 611 gives a trial court broad control over the mode 
and manner in which testimony is offered. Unless such discretion is abused, we will 
affirm its exercise." In re Estate of Russell 852 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 1993). 
ISSUE 2: Whether res judicata and issue preclusion bar modification of the 
parties' joint custody order. 
Standard of Review: "A court's legal conclusion as to whether a material change 
in circumstances has occurred that would warrant reconsidering the . . . decree is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 912 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). 
ISSUE 3: Whether the trial court properly heard the testimony of Dr. Monica 
Christy regarding the best interests of the child in its determination of whether a 
substantial and material change in circumstance had occurred. 
Standard of Review: "A court's legal conclusion as to whether a material change 
in circumstances has occurred that would warrant reconsidering the . . . decree is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, 912 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). 
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ISSUE 4: Whether the trial court's findings of fact were supported by the 
evidence and were legally sufficient to sustain its custody order. 
Standard of Review: "A trial court's factual findings underlying a holding of 
material change of circumstances in a divorce decree and a determination of the 
children's best interests may not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. A court's legal 
conclusion as to whether a material change in circumstances has occurred that would 
warrant reconsidering the . . . decree is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. A judge's 
award of custody . . . is also reviewed for abuse of discretion." Hudema v. Carpenter, 
989 P.2d 491,497 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (quoting Siggv. Sigg , 905 P.2d 908, 912 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1999)). 
ISSUE 5: Whether Ms. Huish's argument that Dr. Hale's involvement in this case 
as special master deprived her of due process is adequately briefed, and if adequately 
briefed, whether Ms. Huish waived any right she may have had to object to Dr. Hale as 
special master. 
Standard of Review: Although the court generally reviews the determination to 
modify a divorce decree for an abuse of discretion, insofar as that determination is based 
on a conclusion of law, it is reviewed for correctness. Medley v. Medley, 2004 UT App 
16, 93 P.3d 847. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of this appeal or of central importance to this 
appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below 
This appeal concerns custody of the parties' minor child, Taylor, who is now 12 
years old, having been born on July 11, 1996. The initial custody order in this case was 
set forth in the parties' Decree of Paternity, entered July 8, 2002 ("the paternity decree"). 
R.1467 (Add. 1). The paternity decree was based on the parties' stipulation, read into the 
record on the day that had been set for trial of the custody issues, and subsequent rulings 
of the trial court clarifying the same. R.1467-68. The recommendations of the custody 
evaluator appointed by the trial court at this stage in the litigation, Dr. Carol Gage, were 
incorporated into the paternity decree, R.2788, which awarded the parties joint legal and 
physical custody of Taylor. R. 1468-69. 
Respondent and appellee Glen Frank Munro ("Mr. Munro") filed a petition to 
modify the custody and related provisions of the paternity decree on March 18, 2003. 
R.1878. Dr. Monica Christy was appointed to conduct a custody evaluation, and 
thereafter an 11-day trial was held on the petition, commencing July 13, 2004 and 
concluding September 15, 2004. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court first 
heard argument and made findings regarding whether a substantial and material change in 
circumstance warranting termination of the joint custody order had been established. 
Thereafter, the trial court heard argument and made findings regarding Taylor's best 
interests, and fashioned a new custody order, which is set forth in its Order Modifying 
Decree of Paternity, entered April 11, 2005 ("the Order"). R.2806. It is from this Order 
that Petitioner and appellant Kathy Lenay Huish ("Ms. Huish) has appealed. 
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Statement of Facts 
1. Ms. Huish and Mr. Munro began dating in January of 1993. Ms. Huish was 
31 years old, recently separated from her husband, John Huish, and living in a home next 
to her mother's in Murray, Utah. She had one son, Patrick Huish, who was 4 years old. 
Mr. Munro, was 35 years old when he met Ms. Huish. He had never been married, had 
no children, and lived in a condominium in Park City. Both parties worked, and continue 
to work, for Delta Air Lines, as a flight attendant and pilot respectively. R.992. 
2. Mr. Munro had serious reservations about his relationship with Ms. Huish 
when Taylor was conceived some two years later. Nevertheless, after deep reflection, 
Mr. Munro determined that it was important to give the child he and Ms. Huish were 
expecting a home and a family, and he asked her to marry him. Ms. Huish refused. 
R.993. 
3. The parties' child, Taylor Munro, was born Thursday, July 11, 1996. Mr. 
Munro took time off work to care for Taylor after his birth. When Ms. Huish left the 
hospital on or about July 13, 1996, she went home to stay with her mother in Murray, and 
Mr. Munro took Taylor to care for him in Park City. From that time until late August of 
1996, when the parties began residing together in Las Vegas, Nevada, with the exception 
of the days that Mr. Munro was flying, Taylor resided with Mr. Munro in Park City and 
Mr. Munro had primary responsibility for Taylor. R.993. 
4. After the parties began residing together in Las Vegas, they arranged their 
schedules so that one of them was available to care for Taylor directly when the other 
was out of town. When Mr. Munro and Ms. Huish were both home, and during the 
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period that Ms. Huish did not work, Glen was primarily responsible for caring for Taylor. 
He performed the bulk of the primary caretaking tasks for Taylor, including feeding him, 
changing him, getting up at night with him, bathing him, etc. R.994. 
5. The parties' relationship with one another was marked by conflict, and they 
finally separated on March 30, 1999. From the date of their separation until Ms. Huish 
was served with Mr. Munro's court papers requesting primary custody of Taylor on 
November 20, 1999, with rare exception, and with Ms. Huish's acquiescence, Mr. Munro 
cared for Taylor when he was not flying, generally 20 days or more per month. Ms. 
Huish was often not home when Glen came to drop Taylor off or pick him up, and Taylor 
was left with or received by his grandmother, Ms. Huish's mother. Taylor was often left 
in his grandmother's care by Ms. Huish when Glen was flying, even when Ms. Huish was 
not flying. R.995. 
6. The custody proceedings, initiated in Nevada, were ultimately transferred to 
Utah. Once here, the court appointed Dr. Carol Gage to conduct a custody evaluation, 
and she commenced her evaluation in January of 2000. The evaluation was completed in 
August of 2000. Mr. Munro relayed his account of the custodial arrangement between 
himself and Taylor to Dr. Gage, which rested on the unstated agreement between the 
parties that, when Mr. Munro was home, he was responsible for Taylor. Mr, Munro 
further relayed his sense that Kathy was less committed to direct parenting of Taylor, and 
that even when she had Taylor, she would often leave him with other caretakers or her 
mother. Ms. Huish was dishonest with Dr. Gage throughout the evaluation. Where Ms. 
Huish's version of events conflicted with Mr. Munro's, Dr. Gage adopted Ms. Huish's. 
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Moreover, she ignored data that corroborated Glen's version of events. Nevertheless, Dr. 
Gage recommended, based on the strong bond that she observed between Mr. Munro and 
Taylor, that the parties have joint legal custody, and that Mr. Munro have three weekends 
per month with Taylor, to include Thursday after school through Sunday evening if Mr. 
Munro was in Park City and available to take Taylor to school, plus an additional 
weekday overnight if Mr. Munro was in Park City and available to take Taylor to school. 
R.999-1000. Dr. Gage's recommendations were premised on her belief that, once the 
custody issues were resolved, the parties' ability to communicate and work with one 
another would improve. R.2788. 
7. Mr. Munro was upset by the evaluation because he felt that he had not been 
believed. However, he felt that the access schedule that had been recommended, if 
complied with by Ms. Huish, would be acceptable. He doubted that Ms. Huish would in 
fact comply. He continued to feel that he was more capable of acting in Taylor's best 
interests and should be designated primary custodial parent. However, considering all the 
factors, and desiring to bring an end to the litigation for Taylor's benefit, he determined 
that he would reside in Park City when Taylor was in school so that he could enjoy the 
favorable access schedule, and that he would be willing to settle the case on the terms 
recommended by Dr. Gage. R. 1001. 
8. Shortly after the evaluation was released, Ms. Huish filed a motion 
requesting that the court award her "sole custody" of Taylor and that Mr. Munro's time 
with Taylor be restricted to the minimum required by law. Mr. Munro felt extremely 
threatened by Ms. Huish's continued focus on limiting his role in Taylor's life, even after 
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Dr. Gage had recommended that he should not be so limited. He therefore determined to 
pursue another custody evaluation, believing that the court would benefit from a more 
balanced view than that provided by Dr. Gage. Through counsel, he began to contact 
custody evaluators. Upon contacting Dr. Matthew Davies, however, he became 
convinced that another evaluation would not be best for Taylor. He therefore determined 
to work with Dr. Davies to attempt to co-parent Taylor with Ms. Huish, as recommended 
by Dr. Davies to be in Taylor's best interest. R.1001. 
9. From the beginning, Ms. Huish was unwilling to cooperate in facilitated 
parenting of Taylor. She was unable to focus on Taylor, but instead focused on 
relationship problems with Mr. Munro. She continued to insist that she could not deal 
with Mr. Munro. She did not provide Dr. Davies her flight schedules in a timely manner, 
and then withheld Taylor from Mr. Munro during the time that no access schedule was 
yet developed by Dr. Davies. She raised concerns about Taylor's well-being, but then 
refused to take steps recommended by Dr. Davies to address the concerns. She refused to 
contribute anything financially to Dr. Davies services. Eventually, in April 2001, she 
notified Dr. Davies, through counsel, that she would not participate further in parenting 
facilitation. R.1001-02. 
10. Mr. Munro felt that it was indeed unfortunate that Ms. Huish would not 
work with Dr. Davies. He felt Dr. Davies provided a mechanism of lessening the 
dissention between he and Ms. Huish for Taylor's sake. He therefore filed a motion to 
appoint Dr. Davies as special master. A hearing was held on the motion on May 2, 2001, 
and Commissioner Arnett approved the appointment of a special master. However, the 
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Commissioner sua sponte appointed Dr. Valerie Hale to act in that capacity, rather than 
Dr.Davies. R.1002. 
11. Because Dr. Hale had been contacted by counsel for Mr. Munro prior to the 
Commissioner's sua sponte appointment, counsel immediately notified Ms. Huish's 
counsel of that fact, requesting that he "[p]lease advise at once whether you will object to 
Dr. Hale acting as special master based on this disclosure." Ex. P-135 (Add. 4). 
Additionally, Dr. Hale disclosed the prior contact to the parties and the court in a letter to 
the court dated June 13, 2001, after receiving notice that she had been appointed as 
special master. Ex. P-l 12 (Add. 5). With full knowledge of Dr. Hale's previous contact 
with Ms. Bigelow, Ms. Huish and her counsel executed Dr. Hale's Special Master 
Services Procedures Agreement on July 23, 2001, agreeing to Dr. Hale's involvement in 
the case as special master. Ex. R-229 (Add. 6). 
12. Trial on the custody and child support issues was scheduled to take place 
September 4, 2001. On that day, at court, the parties reached a global resolution, and the 
agreement was read into the record. R.1467. The agreement, which was incorporated 
into the parties' decree of paternity, included an award of joint legal custody of Taylor to 
the parties and specifically provided for the continuing involvement of Dr. Hale as 
special master in the case. R.1468. The agreement further incorporated a custody 
arrangement substantially similar to that recommended by Dr. Gage, consisting of Mr. 
Munro having 10 days and 12 days per month with Taylor in alternating months. R.1469. 
13. After the custody issues were resolved by legally binding stipulation, Ms. 
Huish nevertheless persisted in creating problems, and the conflict between the parties 
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continued unabated. R.2788, 3406:68. Specifically, Ms. Huish was obstructionist and 
abusive with Dr. Hale, causing Dr. Hale to ultimately seek and obtain a release from 
further responsibility as the court-appointed special master. R.1879. Ms. Huish also 
refused to communicate with Mr. Munro regarding Taylor's health, school, scheduling, 
surrogate care, or any other matters pertaining to parenting of Taylor, insisted upon 
acting unilaterally on all matters pertaining to Taylor, and consistently violated both the 
letter and the spirit of the joint legal custody provisions of the decree of paternity. 
R.1879. 
14. In or about November 2002, Ms. Huish remarried and began planning to 
relocate with Taylor to Kwajalein, a 2-mile atoll located 2,100 miles southwest of Hawaii 
and 1,400 miles east of Guam. The atoll is off-limits to unofficial visitors and is 
inaccessible except by military transport. R.1880. Such a move would have severely 
restricted Mr. Munro's access to Taylor, and would have made enforcement of any 
custody or parent-time order relating to Taylor extremely difficult. It would have, 
additionally, required modification of both the residency and joint physical custody 
provisions of the decree of paternity. 
15. Mr. Munro filed a petition to modify the decree of paternity in March of 
2003, after trying unsuccessfully to implement the terms of the parties' stipulated 
agreement for nearly 18 months. R.1878. Ms. Huish sent formal notification of her 
intent to relocate shortly thereafter, on April 11, 2003. R.2205. 
16. The court granted Mr. Munro's motion to appoint a custody evaluator on 
May 29,2003, R.2217, and thereafter the parties agreed to the appointment of Dr. 
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Monica Christy. Dr. Christy completed her evaluation on or about November 21, 2003, 
R.2411, and after an unsuccessful pre-trial settlement conference, the matter was certified 
for trial on January 29, 2004. R.2454. Trial ensued several months later, spanning 
eleven days from July 13, 2004 to September 15, 2004. Dr. Christy testified extensively, 
as did Dr. Hale, Dr. Davies, Dr. Gage, and numerous lay witnesses, including both Mr. 
Munro and Ms. Huish. At the close of the evidence, the court made extensive findings of 
fact based on the evidence, which are incorporated in its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. R.2787 (Add. 2). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Ms. Huish was not deprived of her due process rights when the trial court did not 
permit her to attempt another bite at the apple to cross-examine Dr. Christy in rebuttal on 
matters that she should have covered in her initial, extensive, cross-examination of Dr. 
Christy. 
The trial court was not precluded by the doctrine of res judicata or issue preclusion 
from modifying the decree of paternity entered in this case in July of 2002. The well-
established case law governing modification of custody orders permits modification 
where a substantial and material change in circumstance is demonstrated, as was done in 
this case. Further, the trial court complied with the bifurcation requirements set forth by 
this court, separately conducting its modification and best interest analyses. The trial 
court was not required to further bifurcate the proceedings, and it acted within its 
discretion in allowing the testimony of Dr. Christy relating to both issues to be taken at 
once. 
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The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are legally sufficient and 
are supported by the evidence. 
Ms. Huish has not adequately briefed her argument that she was deprived of due 
process by Dr. Hale's involvement in this case as special master, and she waived any 
claim she may have had relating to Dr. Hale's prior involvement on behalf of Mr. Munro 
by agreeing to Dr. Hale as special master after full disclosure of that involvement. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED REASONABLE CONTROL OVER 
THE ORDER AND MODE OF TESTIMONY 
Ms. Huish was not deprived of her due process rights, nor was she precluded from 
testifying on her own behalf or presenting witnesses. Rule 611 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence directs the trial court to "exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of 
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence . . . to avoid needless consumption of 
time." Utah R. Evid. 611(2). In so doing, the "trial court [has] broad control over the 
mode and manner in which testimony is offered," In re Estate of Russell 852 P.2d 997, 
999 (Utah 1993). The Utah Supreme Court has affirmed this broad control "[u]nless 
such discretion is abused." Id, The trial court exercised reasonable control over the order 
and mode of testimony in this case, and in fact, was extremely lenient with Ms. Huish. 
Ms. Huish's complaint that she was denied her due process rights stems from 
events occurring on the ninth day of trial after the conclusion of Ms. Huish's testimony 
during her case-in-chief. Counsel had agreed that Mr. Munro could take some of his 
rebuttal witnesses out of order at that point, and this agreement was represented to the 
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court by Mr. Drake. R.3414:1521. The court inquired of Mr. Drake what remained on 
his case-in-chief. Mr. Drake responded: "We intend to call the respondent and possibly 
Monica Christy as a direct witness and that would be it." Id. The court then inquired 
what Mr. Drake would be asking Dr. Christy in her case-in-chief that he could not cover 
on cross or rebuttal. R.3414:1521-22. Mr. Drake responded, "Well, your Honor I'm just 
looking at the scope of the rebuttal and me having to go to questions limited by that 
scope, if the Court would be willing I'd like to expand that scope just to do that. Then we 
can end it all at one time." R.3414:1522. Id. The court then stated: "Well, my sense is 
as long as Dr. Christy's here let's get her on and off, and not have to take her back and 
forth. So with that I'm going to allow leeway on both sides as to completing her 
testimony, with the idea that you don't abuse it and you don't bring up new issues, but we 
get her out of the way." Id. (emphasis added). 
At no time did the court state that Ms. Huish could, by purportedly calling Dr. 
Christy in her case-in-chief, take another stab at cross-examination on issues that she'd 
neglected to address in day one and two of trial during the cross-examination of Dr. 
Christy that occurred at that time and extended nearly a full day. 
Further, a close reading of the record establishes that the only line of inquiry 
disallowed by the court was during the rebuttal phase, on the tenth day of trial. Mr. 
Drake began cross-examining Dr. Christy regarding matters that went beyond the scope 
of her rebuttal testimony, but which where within the scope of her initial testimony on the 
first and second day of trial and should have been addressed in cross at that time. This 
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was the objection that was made, and sustained. In sustaining the objection, the court 
explained: 
This matter should have been taken up on cross. If it wasn't 
taken up on cross you've waived it, you cannot revive it by 
calling a witness on your own behalf or terming it to be 
rebuttal. Rebuttal is only . . . as to what . . . Ms. Bigelow has 
done. And even though I agree with you [Mr. Drake] that 
I've allowed you to expand it a bit, it still has to be new 
information not covered or coverable under cross. 
R.3415:1725 (emphasis added). Clearly, the trial court committed no error by thus 
controlling the orderly presentation of evidence and not allowing Ms. Huish another bite 
at the cross-examination apple on the tenth day of trial. 
The trial court did not rule, as Ms. Huish contends, that Ms. Huish could not 
pursue a line of inquiry with Dr. Christy that would properly be characterized as direct 
testimony in her case-in-chief, that is, new information, not within the scope of what 
should have been covered in the initial cross-examination. Ms. Huish's argument that 
she was denied the opportunity to present her case-in-chief is therefore simply erroneous. 
By requiring Ms. Huish to complete her cross-examination of Dr. Christy after Dr. 
Christy's direct examination, and not permitting her to cross-examine her again about 
matters not raised in rebuttal, which should have been addressed, if at all, in the initial 
cross-examination, the trial court reasonably exercised its Rule 611 control over the mode 
and order of interrogating witnesses and the presentation of evidence. See Utah R. Evid. 
611(b). 
The trial lasted over eleven days. Of these eleven days, Ms. Huish's case-in chief 
spanned five and one-half days. Clearly, Ms. Huish was given a "meaningful opportunity 
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to be heard by submitting testimony herself and by witnesses." In re S.H., 2007 UT App 
8, ^[21, 155 P.3d 109. There was no abuse of discretion, and no deprivation of Ms. 
Huish's due process rights. 
II. RES JUDICATA AND ISSUE PRECLUSION DO NOT BAR 
MODIFICATION OF THE INITIAL JOINT CUSTODY ORDER 
Because there was a substantial and material change in circumstances, the res 
judicata, or issue preclusion, doctrine does not bar Mr. Munro from petitioning the court 
to modify the custody provisions of the parties' initial paternity decree. Although Utah 
appellate courts have stated that the doctrine of res judicata applies in custody actions and 
subsequent modification proceedings, its application in these instances is "distinguished . 
. . because of the equitable doctrine that allows courts to reopen determinations if the 
moving party can demonstrate a substantial change of circumstances." Smith v. Smith, 
793 P.2d 407, 410 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing Hogge v. Hogge, 649 P.2d 51, 53 (Utah 
1982)). Mr. Munro established a substantial change in circumstances that warranted 
modification of the custody provisions of the parties' paternity decree. The doctrine of 
res judicata was therefore not offended when the court granted Mr. Munro5s petition to 
modify. 
A. Circumstances Substantially Changed After Entry of the Paternity Decree 
The trial court found that there had been a substantial and material change since 
entry of the paternity decree; namely, that the joint legal custody provisions of the decree 
were not working or were inappropriate under the circumstances. R.2789. This finding 
is as further detailed in the court's subsidiary findings, found at paragraphs 1 through 6 of 
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the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. R.2788-89. The trial court found as an 
additional ground for modification the petitioner's planned relocation to Kwajalein, an 
atoll located thousands of miles from the child's primary residence established in the 
decree of paternity. R.2789-90. 
The Utah Supreme Court has described a change in circumstances that warrants 
modification of custody as one that has had "some material relationship to and substantial 
effect on parenting ability or the functioning of the presently existing custodial 
relationship." Becker v. Becker, 693 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah 1984). The court has further 
specifically held that "[t]he nonfunctioning of a joint custody arrangement is clearly a 
substantial change in circumstances which justifies reopening the custody issue." Moody 
v. Moody, 715 P.2d 507, 509 (Utah 1985). 
Ms. Huish argues that because the parties were engaged in conflict prior to the 
entry of the paternity decree, and because this conflict continued unabated, no substantial 
change in circumstances occurred. While true that the parties' conflict unfortunately 
continued after entry of the decree of paternity, the substantial change in circumstances is 
not that conflict arose where once there was none, but rather that the joint custody 
arrangement did not function as it was anticipated that it would.1 
1
 In addition, under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.4(3), the trial court must terminate 
an order of joint legal custody and enter an order of sole legal custody if it "determines 
that the joint legal custody order is unworkable or inappropriate under existing 
circumstances." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.4(3). When this subsection was added to 
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The parties' stipulated agreement to joint custody was based on their hope and 
commitment that it would be a workable arrangement. See R.3408:440. Dr. Gage based 
her initial recommendation for joint legal custody on her hope that the parties conflict 
would end upon resolution of the custody issue. See R.2788; 3410:854. Despite the 
belief of the parties and of Dr. Gage that the joint custody arrangement would work, 
however, it did not. Instead, the conflict between the parties continued, and the parties' 
child was exposed to ongoing conflict and dissention. See R. 2789; 3410:854-55. 
The foregoing findings and evidence establish that the joint custody order was 
unworkable under existing circumstances, which constitutes a change in circumstance 
sufficient to dissolve the joint custody order. The court did not err in so doing. 
B. Best Interests of the Child Has Priority Over Res Judicata 
While acknowledging that the res judicata doctrine applies in divorce and 
modification actions despite the trial court's continuing jurisdiction in these matters, the 
Utah Supreme Court limited the doctrine to actions in which changed circumstances are 
established. See Hogge v. Hogge, 639 P.2d 5L 53 (Utah 1982). The supreme court 
section 30-3-10.4 in 2005, it could have been included under subsection (1), which 
requires a determination that the circumstances have materially and substantially changed 
and that a modification would be in the best interest of the child. See id. § 30-3-10.4(1). 
It is clear that because subsection (3) stands alone, under the plain language of the statute, 
this determination either does not require or presupposes a finding of a substantial change 
of circumstances. 
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established a two-part bifurcated process in "a parent seeking a change in custody of a 
child must first establish that there has been a substantial and material change in the 
circumstances upon which the original custody award was based, and second and 
thereafter, that a change in custody is in the best interests of the child." Elmer v. Elmer, 
776 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah 1989). 
Yet, the Utah appellate courts have emphasized that when a custody determination 
was not adjudicated, but rather was the result of a stipulated decree, the "res judicata 
aspect of the ["changed circumstances"] rule must always be subservient to the best 
interests of the child." Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 603 (Utah 1989). Above all, "in 
change of custody cases involving a nonlitigated custody decree, a trial court, in applying 
the changed-circumstances test, should receive evidence on changed circumstances and 
that evidence may include evidence that pertains to the best interests of the child." Id. at 
605. The reasoning for allowing best interests evidence is that "an unadjudicated custody 
decree based on default or stipulation is not based on an objective, impartial 
determination of the best interests of the child," and in fact, may be at odds with the best 
interests of the child. Id. at 603. 
Therefore, even if the custody order at issue in this case were not a joint custody 
order, the trial court was not prohibited from modifying it upon finding that its 
continuation was contrary to the child's best interests. The trial court did so find, stating 
at Finding No. 10: "It is clear that the current custody order has resulted in a high 
conflict, high stress situation that is not good for Taylor and must change for Taylor's 
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best interests." R. 2790. Petitioner has made no attempt to counter this finding, which 
does no less than compel a modification of the existing custody order. 
C. Estoppel Does Not Apply 
Mr. Munro should not be estopped from alleging a substantial and material change 
in circumstance. Ms. Huish suggests that Mr. Munro deluded her into entering into a 
stipulation, all the time planning to thereafter "ambush" her with a petition to modify. 
Ms. Huish cites to no record evidence to support her quixotic view of Mr. Munro's inner 
thoughts and intentions. In actuality, both parties were prepared for trial at the initial 
custody hearing, and appeared at the trial ready to go forward. However, with the 
assistance of the trial court, the custody evaluator, and counsel, the parties instead forged 
an agreement, which was read into the record and thereafter incorporated into the parties' 
paternity decree. As the trial court found, the agreement incorporated, "in sum and 
substance" the recommendations of Dr. Carol Gage, who was the court-appointed 
custody evaluator in the initial custody phase. R.2788, f^ 2. Mr. Munro made no 
misrepresentations of fact and had no ability to persuade Ms. Huish one way or the other 
during these drawn-out negotiations. Her decisions were made entirely upon the advice 
of her counsel, her own desires, her understanding of the custody evaluator's 
recommendations, and the input she received from the trial court. 
Furthermore, even if Mr. Munro had been cunning enough at the time the 
stipulation was entered to plan to later seek modify it, he did not unilaterally create the 
circumstances that warranted its modification. Clearly, Ms. Huish's plan to move to 
Kwajalein was completely outside of Mr. Munro's control. Further, as Dr. Christy 
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testified, the joint custody order did not function primarily because of Ms. Huish's 
actions, in particular, her steadfast refusal to communicate with Mr. Munro and treat him 
as a co-parent of their son. See R.3406:68. 
Finally, for policy reasons, parties cannot be estopped from pursuing a 
modification of a detrimental custody order because they stipulated to it. Logic and our 
case law dictates, instead, that a stipulated order be more amenable to modification, not 
less, as the stipulated order is not based on evidence presented to the trial court and the 
resulting findings. And, were estoppel to be applied in these circumstances, parties 
would be deterred from resolving conflicts by negotiated settlement, which is clearly 
contrary to public policy. 
III. THE COURT PROPERLY HEARD DR. CHRISTY'S TESTIMONY IN ITS 
CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES DETERMINATION 
Mr. Munro called Dr. Christy as his first witness at trial in his case in chief. 
R. 3406:37. Dr. Christy's testimony addressed both whether a substantial and material 
change in circumstances had occurred, and whether a change in custody would be in 
Taylor's best interests. R. 3406:37-130,162-230. It was proper for the trial court to hear 
best interest testimony and change in circumstance testimony together, as our appellate 
courts have relaxed the bifurcation requirement when the original custody determination 
was not litigated. See Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 604 (Utah 1989); Maughanv. 
Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 160 (Utah App. 1989). The court summarized these holdings, 
stating: "[This] moderation of the evidentiary process is justified because the trial court 
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has not previously had an opportunity to make a through examination of the child's best 
interests." Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 475 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Both Elmer and Maughan allowed the trial court to incorporate evidence on the 
best interests of the child within its change of circumstances determination. In 
Cummings, this court relaxed the bifurcation distinction even further, holding that a trial 
court, when reviewing a petition for modification of custody when custody had not been 
previously litigated, need not bifurcate where the evidence concerning both changed 
circumstances and best interests would be the same. See Cummings, 821 P.2d at 475. In 
such a circumstance, the trial court need only "conduct a separate analysis and make 
separate findings as to substantial change in circumstances." Id. 
In this case, Dr. Christy's testimony concerned the non-functioning of the joint 
custody order, as well best interests factors relating to appropriate custody orders once 
joint custody was terminated. The trial court heard argument on these two distinct issues 
separately, proceeding to hear argument regarding best interests only after having made 
separate findings and conclusions pertaining to changed circumstances. Clearly, the 
court conducted a separate analysis and made separate findings as to changed 
circumstances, as directed by our appellate decisions, and the court did not err in 
permitting Dr. Christy to testify as to both issues. Such a bifurcation is not required. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT FINDINGS OF FACT ARE SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE AND ARE LEGALLY ADEQUATE 
The trial court's findings of fact are sufficiently supported by the evidence and are 
legally adequate. Ms. Huish fails to meet her burden to prove that they are "so lacking in 
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support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, and therefore, clearly 
erroneous." Walton v. Walton, 814 P.2d 619, 621 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Nor does Ms. 
Huish demonstrate that the findings are legally inadequate. Rather, the findings and the 
record establish that the court did not abuse its discretion in terminating the 2002 joint 
custody order and awarding sole legal custody of Taylor to Mr. Munro. 
A. Finding No. 7 
Ms. Huish contends the trial court did not address the salient factor of the duration 
of the initial physical custody arrangement, Taylor's relative bond with his parents, in its 
findings and that this constitutes reversible error. See Appellant's Brief at 31-34. 
Indeed, factors the trial court may consider in deciding whether to modify a custody 
arrangement are (1) identifying a strong bond with a particular parent, see Utah R. Jud. 
Admin. 4-903(5)(D), and (2) scrutinizing "a child's need for stability," by the duration of 
a prior custody arrangement, see Hudema v. Carpenter, 989 P.2d 491, 498 (Utah Ct. App. 
1999). However, both rule 4-903 and Utah case law list numerous other factors that a 
trial court may consider, and the trial court need not consider each factor on equal 
footing. See id. "Generally it is within the trial court's discretion to determine, based on 
the facts before it and within the confines set by the appellate courts, where a particular 
factor falls with the spectrum of relative importance and to accord each factor its 
appropriate weight." Id 
The trial court analyzed several factors, and made several findings based on its 
analysis. Although typically, a court may emphasize maintaining the stability of a prior 
physical custody arrangement, in this matter it was of little or no significance because the 
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decree of paternity did not award sole physical custody of Taylor to Ms. Huish. Rather, 
the decree of paternity awarded each party substantial time with Taylor, with Mr. Munro 
having 10 days and 12 days per month in alternating months. The trial court therefore 
properly accorded this factor little weight. 
The court also properly accorded the issue of bonding little weight. Dr. Christy's 
evaluation made clear that Taylor "appears to feel secure no matter which parent he is 
with" R.3380, at 4. Nor did any expert involved in the case identify a disparity in the 
level of bonding between the parties and Taylor. The court was not required, nor should 
it have, relied upon random and unilateral observations of Ms. Huish's friends to make 
findings contrary to the observations of neutral experts appointed to evaluate precisely 
these factors. Because the factor weighed in neither parties' favor, it was properly 
accorded little weight. 
B. Finding No. 8 
The trial court found that Ms. Huish's planned relocation to Kwajalein with the 
minor child, during the time the petition of modification was pending, constituted an 
additional change in circumstance that warranted modifying the decree. R. 2789. This 
finding is sufficiently supported by the evidence, being in fact undisputed, see, e.g., R. 
3406:48-56; R.2205, and constitutes an additional ground for modification of the 
paternity decree. 
As the court noted in its findings, Ms. Huish's decision, after a quick marriage, to 
uproot the parties' child and relocate halfway around the world to an extremely isolated 
atoll in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, followed by a turnabout in this position on the 
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first day of trial, evidenced a high degree of changeability, impulsivity, and lack of 
planning on her part. R.2797. It was not an abuse of the court's discretion to consider 
this evidence in its modification determination. 
C. Finding No. 10 
Ms. Huish takes issue with the court's finding that the current custody order, "has 
resulted in a high conflict, high stress situation that is not good for Taylor and must 
change for Taylor's best interests." R. 2790. Ms. Huish does not dispute the fact of the 
high conflict, but only that it is not good for Taylor, arguing that despite the conflict, 
Taylor is doing well, so the conflict must be okay. 
Ms. Huish's views regarding the benefit to Taylor of his ongoing exposure to 
conflict are contradicted by all the testimony that was adduced on this topic. Dr. Gage 
testified that she agreed that "it is the consensus in the psychological research that 
dissension between the parents is harmful for children." R. 3410:855. Dr. Christy 
testified that "I think [Taylor] will become more and more aware of the conflict between 
his parents, and that is always unsettling for a child." R. 3406:76. At no point was any 
testimony adduced that supports Ms. Huish's novel position that the court erred in 
determining that the admittedly high conflict between the parties is not good for Taylor. 
This determination is clearly supported by the record, as well as common sense and 
human understanding, and is not an abuse of discretion. 
D. Finding No. 11 
The trial court stated in Finding 11 that it considered several factors, including 
those listed in Rule 4-903, in determining custody. See R. 2790. When the trial court 
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found that a particular factor was not significant in this case, it did not make a finding. 
See id. This does not constitute an erroneous legal conclusion as Ms. Huish contends, 
nor does it constitute an abuse of the court's discretion. 
Ms. Huish challenges the trial court's failure to address the following factors: that 
Ms. Huish has had primary physical custody of Taylor since Taylor's birth; that Taylor is 
happy and doing well; and that Taylor is bonded to Ms. Huish and to his maternal 
grandmother. Although Taylor seems to be doing well in school, the lack of 
communication between his parents will continually cause him stress, as noted by Drs. 
Gage and Christy. See R. 3410:855; 3406:76. In Hudema v. Carpenter, the court 
emphasized that if the child has thrived in an existing arrangement, it should not be 
disturbed. See 989 P.2d 491, 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Taylor has been in the 
unfortunate circumstance of being caught between his parents' failed communications in 
the past since the decree has been in place, which cannot be characterized as thriving. 
The court did not abuse its broad discretion in concluding that some factors were more 
significant than others in determining best interests. 
E. Finding No. 13 
The trial court determined that the preference of keeping Taylor together with his 
half-brother Patrick was not dispositive because of the children's age difference and time 
away from each other due to having different fathers. See R. 2790. Further, the trial 
court correctly concluded that these siblings could continue to have substantially similar 
time together with Mr. Munro being awarded primary physical custody by arranging Ms. 
Huish's parent-time schedule to coordinate with the time Patrick was in her care. Id. By 
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this, the trial court did not fail to consider this factor; rather, the trial court did not reach 
the conclusion pertaining to this factor that Ms. Huish urged. It was within the trial 
court's discretion to do so. 
As this court noted in Hudema v. Carpenter, "The importance of the myriad of 
factors used in determining a child's best interests ranges from the possibly relevant to 
the critically important." Hudema, 989 P.2d 491 at 499. It is within the trial court's 
discretion to determine which factors carry more importance in a particular case. The 
court did not abuse its discretion in according this factor less weight given the 
circumstances present in this case. 
F. Finding No. 15(a) 
The evidence adequately supports the trial court's conclusion that Mr. Munro 
would best allow for Taylor to maintain frequent and continuing contact with Ms. Huish 
than the converse option. See R. 2790. The trial court's findings outline several 
subsidiary findings underlying this finding, all of which are amply supported by the 
record. For example, Dr. Christy testified that Mr. Munro would communicate better 
with Ms. Huish than the Ms. Huish would with him and that Mr. Munro was less negative 
about Ms. Huish than Ms. Huish was about him. See R. 3406:71; 3415:1674-78, 1852. 
"[T]he trial court's proximity to the witnesses and its opportunity to hear their testimony 
and observe their demeanor, places it in a far more advantaged position" to enter findings 
of fact. Shioii v. Shioil 712 P.2d 197, 201 (Utah 1985). The trial court's findings will 
not be overturned if they are supported by the evidence. 
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It is Ms. Huish's burden to marshall the evidence supporting the trial court's 
finding to demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has occurred. Ms. Huish has failed to 
do this. The evidence she marshals - while partial only - amply supports the trial court's 
findings and outweighs the contradictory evidence. Further, the trial court's advantaged 
position in judging the credibility of the evidence cannot be gainsaid. The trial court had 
reason question Ms. Huish's credibility, as her testimony directly contradicted Dr. 
Christy's testimony on key points. See R.2797. And as much as Ms. Huish would like to 
change the record now, it nevertheless reveals that she called witness after witness to 
testify disparagingly about Mr. Munro. The finding is not an abuse of discretion. 
G. Finding No. 15(b) 
The trial court's finding that Ms. Huish is changeable and lacks stability is also 
amply supported by the record. Dr. Christy testified that Ms. Huish was more changeable 
than Mr. Munro. See R. 3406:55, 81. She also testified that Ms. Huish's emotional 
difficulties are not transitory, that she is "very insecure and becomes very distraught and 
emotional at any kind of. . . confrontation." 3415:1675-76. There was ample, additional 
evidence supporting this finding, both marshaled by Ms. Huish and not. The trial court 
did not abuse its discretion, after hearing this testimony and reviewing the evidence, in 
determining that Mr. Munro was better able to provide stability for Taylor. 
H. Finding No. 15(c) 
The trial court's findings of fact leading to its conclusion that Mr. Munro is more 
compliant with court orders than Ms. Huish is likewise sufficiently supported by the 
evidence. In this regard, this court may take judicial notice of the record on appeal, 
{00003400.DOC /!} 2 6 
which includes its own order of dismissal (with conditional reinstatement) due to Ms. 
Huish's pattern of contumacious conduct. In addition, the evidence marshaled by Ms. 
Huish, though partial, provides ample support for this finding. 
I. Finding No. 16 
In "custody matters, the trial court is accorded particularly broad discretion. Only 
where the trial court's judgment is so flagrantly unjust as to be an abuse of discretion" 
should the appellate court reverse. Shioji, 712 P.2d at 201. The trial court set forth its 
findings of fact at length, regarding both its grounds for modifying the decree and in 
finding that a change of custody was in Taylor's best interests. The findings as a whole 
support the trial court's conclusions and its carefully crafted custody award. The award 
is not an abuse of discretion and should be affirmed. 
VI. MS. HUISH'S SPECIAL MASTER ARGUMENT IS INADEQUATELY 
BRIEFED, AND EVEN IF DEEMED ADEQUATE, MS. HUISH'S 
FAILURE TO OBJECT TO DR. HALE AFTER DISCLOSURE 
PRECLUDES HER FROM RAISING THIS ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
Ms. Huish failed to adequately brief her argument that Dr. Hale's actions as 
Special Master violated "canons of judicial ethics and so tainted the judicial process that 
Kathy was effectively deprived of her rights of due process." See Appellant's Brief, at 2. 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires an appellant to 
state the grounds for review. Utah appellate courts have further explained that an 
inadequately briefed argument is one that is supported by "[a] single, vague sentence 
without citation to the record or legal authority," Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 48 P.3d 918, 
926 n.9 (Utah 2002); or one that fails to provide a "meaningful legal analysis" and 
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"merely contain[s] one or two sentences stating [the] argument generally . . . and then 
broadly conclude[ing] that [appellant] is entitled to relief," State v. Gamblin, 1 P.3d 1108, 
1110-11 (Utah 2000); or finally, one that baldly cites authority without "reasoned 
analysis based upon that authority," State v. Jaeger, 973 P.2d 404, 410 (Utah 1999). 
In place of legal analysis, Ms. Huish cites to one case, Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 743 
(Utah 1990), for the general legal proposition that litigants are entitled to notice and the 
opportunity to present evidence and argument on issues before decision. Ms. Huish 
wholly fails to show what relevance this legal principle has in this case, or to develop 
legal analysis of any kind regarding how she was denied due process relating to Dr. Hale. 
To the extent that Ms. Huish has attempted to throw Dr. Hale into a bad light by 
her claim that Dr. Hale was "paid money by Paige Bigelow" to review Dr. Gage's 
evaluation prior to being appointed as special master, the record unequivocally shows 
that this fact was disclosed to Mr. Huish before she signed Dr. Hale's special master 
agreement, and before she entered into the stipulation whereby Dr. Hale would continue 
as special master after entry of the paternity decree, and as part of its ongoing 
implementation. See Exs. P-135, P-l 12, R.229 & R. 2806. Ms. Huish thereby waived 
any right she may have had to raise this complaint, having determined at the time that she 
was comfortable going forward with Dr. Hale. Clearly, Ms. Huish and only changed her 
mind regarding Dr. Hale when Dr. Hale became sufficiently familiar with the case to 
begin reporting to the court Ms. Huish's inappropriate conduct. 
As the trial court most aptly stated in its ruling following trial, "It's been very 
clear to the Court that if you agree with Ms. [Huish], then everything is fine, but if you 
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disagree with Ms. [Huish], or say anything critical of Ms. [Huish], then it appears that not 
only are you wrong, but you are obviously biased against her, that you are siding with 
Mr. Munro, and that anything from that point on is going to be met with resistance and 
with, and with some sort of contempt. And that is crystal clear to me through the 
testimony of Matt Davies, Valerie Hale, and Dr. Christy." R.3416:2173. Ms. Huish's 
claims of "bias" or impropriety pertaining to Dr. Hale fit squarely within this category 
and should be disregarded. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's Order Modifying Decree of Divorce 
should be affirmed in its entirety, and this court should award Mr. Munro his costs and 
attorney fees incurred in defending this appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /]S day of September, 2007. 
KRUSE LANDA MAYCOCK & RICKS, LLC 
136 East South Temple, 21st Floor 
P.O. Box 45561 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0561 
PAIGE BUGELOW 
Attorney for Respondent / Appellee 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS 
DATE 0-7/10 (0 V 
DECREE OF PATERNITY 
Civil No. 994907668 PA 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial before the Honorable Glenn 
Iwasaki, District Court Judge, on the 4th day of September, 2001, in regard to the custody and 
financial issues, the common law marriage issue having been previously resolved at trial upon 
the court's order of bifurcation. The parties reached agreement on the custody and financial 
issues, which agreement was read upon the record, and the court approved the same. The Court 
subsequently conducted a telephone conference on January 29,2002 with counsel for the parties 
appearing telephonically, and a hearing March 28,2002 with counsel and the parties appearing in 
person and Dr. Valerie Hale, special master, appearing telephonically. The court heard the 
arguments and proffers of counsel and the recommendations of Dr. Valerie Hale, and made 
Decree of Paternity @J 
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nuDDtsnttrrcown 
Third Judtetel Dtetrtot 
KATHY LENAY HUISH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GLEN FRANK MUNRO, 
Respondent. 
JD ,41,-) 
rulings based thereon to clarify and augment the parties' oral stipulation. Based thereon, and for 
good cause appearing, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Respondent, Glen Frank Munro, is hereby declared to be the natural father of the 
minor child, Taylor Michael Munro, born on the 11th day of July, 1996. Said Declaration of 
Paternity is based upon the respondent's acknowledgement and consent to his paternity of said 
minor child. 
2. The parties are hereby awarded joint legal custody of Taylor. The parties shall 
share equal decision-making authority to make all decisions impacting Taylor's health, well-
being, education, religious training, and welfare. If after conferring in good faith regarding such 
a decision the parties are unable to agree, petitioner shall be permitted to make the decision, to 
which respondent may object by stating the reasons therefore and submitting them to Dr. Valerie 
Hale. Dr. Hale, in her capacity as the appointed special master in this case, shall then make the 
final decision. There shall be no presumption that either party's decision making authority is 
greater than the other's, and Dr. Hale shall give the parties' desires pertaining to any such 
decision equal weight, making the determination based on Taylor's best interest and not on any 
parental presumption. 
3. Petitioner Kathy Lenay Huish shall be designated primary physical custodial 
parent. Taylor shall reside with petitioner in Murray, Salt Lake County, Utah, and shall attend 
public school in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, or a private school determined by the parties or 
Dr. Valerie Hale. 
2 
4. Respondent shall be entitled to, at a minimum, the following monthly parent-time 
with Taylor: 
a) The first month beginning with the month of September, 2001, the respondent 
shall have parent-time consisting of two intervals per month from Wednesday when 
respondent shall pick up Taylor from school until Monday morning when respondent 
shall drop off Taylor at to school. 
b) The next month, beginning with the month of October, 2001, respondent shall 
have parent-time consisting of three intervals per month from Thursday when respondent 
shall pick up Taylor from school until Monday morning when respondent shall drop off 
Taylor at school. 
c) Said parent-time shall alternate each month so that one month respondent 
shall have two parent-time intervals as stated hereinabove, and the next month respondent 
shall have three parent-time intervals as stated hereinabove. 
d) The weeks that respondent's parent-time intervals shall occur each month 
shall be consistent from month-to-month and shall be designated by Dr. Valerie Hale, 
until such time as the parties' agree otherwise or Dr. Hale determines that increased 
flexibility in the schedule is warranted. Until such time as Dr. Hale designates otherwise 
upon reviewing the parties' respective scheduling requests and attempting to maximize 
each party's time with Taylor, respondent's parent-time intervals shall occur on the 
second, third and fourth weeks in the three-interval months, and the second and fourth 
weeks in the two-interval months. 
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5. Respondent shall be entitled to the following holidays in years ending in an even 
number, and petitioner shall be entitled to the following holidays in years ending in an odd 
number: 
a) Taylor's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthday beginning at 
3:00 p.m. until 9.00 p.m.; 
b) Human Rights day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7:00 
p.m.; 
c) Spring Break or Easter holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. on the day that school 
lets out for the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the Sunday before school resumes; 
d) Memorial Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7:00 p.m.; 
e) July 24th beginning at 6:00 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 11:00 p.m. 
on the holiday; 
f) Veterans Day holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday until 
7:00 p.m. on the holiday; and 
g) The first half of the Christmas school vacation (defined as the time period 
beginning on the evening Taylor gets out of school for the Christmas school break until 
the evening before he returns to school, except for Christmas Eve and Christmas Day), 
plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1:00 p.m.; 
6. Respondent shall be entitled to the following holidays in years ending in an odd 
number, and petitioner shall be entitled to the following holidays in years ending in an even 
number: 
a) Taylor's birthday on the actual birthday beginning at 3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.; 
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b) Presidents' Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until 7:00 p.m. on Monday; 
c) July 4th beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday until 11:00 p.m. on 
the holiday; 
d) Labor Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7:00 p.m.; 
e) The fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as UEA weekend, 
beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; 
f) Columbus Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday until 7:00 
p.m. on the holiday; 
g) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7:00 p.m. until Sunday at 7:00 
p.m.; 
h) The second half of the Christmas school vacation (defined as the time period 
beginning on the evening Taylor gets out of school for the Christmas school break until 
the evening before he returns to school, except for Christmas Eve and Christmas Day), 
plus Christmas Day beginning at 1:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.; 
7. Respondent shall be entitled to Father's Day every year beginning at 9:00 a.m. 
until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday. Petitioner shall be entitled to Mother's Day every year beginning 
at 9:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday. 
8. Respondent shall be entitled to twelve days of uninterrupted time with Taylor 
during Taylor's summer vacation from school. The uninterrupted time shall occur during a 
month that respondent would otherwise have three parent-time intervals of four days each. 
Respondent shall notify petitioner of the uninterrupted time he plans to take at least 45 days in 
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advance. Petitioner shall be entitled to the remaining eighteen or nineteen days of the same 
month as her extended time with Taylor. 
9. Holidays take precedence over the monthly parent-time, and changes shall not be 
made to the regular rotation of the alternating monthly schedule. If the holiday falls on a 
regularly scheduled school day, respondent shall be responsible for Taylor's attendance at school 
for that school day. 
10. The parties shall each be entitled to telephone contact with Taylor consisting of a 
least one telephone call every other day when Taylor is in the other party's physical custody. 
11. The parties shall each be entitled to care for Taylor when the other party is 
working or unable to personally care for Taylor for any reason. Each party shall provide the 
other party and Dr. Valerie Hale with his or her work schedule for the ensuing month on or 
before the last day of each month, and shall notify the other party of any changes to said 
schedule or any other events necessitating surrogate care of more than 4 hours duration as soon 
as they know of the same. 
12. The parties shall each be bound by the advisory guidelines set forth at Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-33, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by 
reference. 
13. Dr. Valerie Hale shall continue in her role as Special Master in this case. Both 
parties shall cooperate with Dr. Hale to resolve any disputes that may arise between them 
relating to the parent-time set forth above, decision-making regarding Taylor, or any other issue 
relating to Taylor. Subject to either party's right to bring any matter before the court for final 
determination, Dr. Hale shall be authorized to: 
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a) Make decisions resolving conflicts between the parties that do not significantly 
affect the court's exclusive jurisdiction to determine fundamental issues of custody and 
parent-time, which decisions are to be effective as orders when made and continue in 
effect until modified or set aside by the court; 
b) Determine appropriate school arrangements for Taylor; 
c) Determine appropriate healthcare management, including mental healthcare, 
for Taylor; 
d) Determine appropriate surrogate care arrangements for Taylor when neither 
party is able to provide personal care for Taylor; 
e) Make decisions regarding requested alterations in the parent-time schedule; 
f) Modify parent-time and/or custody on a temporary basis; and 
g) Make any other decision relating to Taylor that petitioner and respondent are 
unable to resolve between them. 
h) Respondent shall pay seventy-five percent and petitioner shall pay twenty-five 
percent of Dr. Hale's fees incurred from the date of her appointment as special master in 
this case. 
14. Beginning with the month of September 2001, respondent shall pay to petitioner 
the sum of $720 per month as child support with said payments being made one-half by the 5th 
and one-half by the 20 of each month. Said amount is based upon petitioner's gross income of 
$2,209 per month and respondent's gross income of $14,134 per month. Further, in the event 
Taylor attends private school, respondent shall pay any and all of Taylor's private school 
expenses. 
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15. Respondent shall maintain health insurance for Taylor as long as the same is 
available through his employment, and each party shall pay one-half of Taylor's portion of the 
premium for said insurance, together with one-half of all uninsured medical and dental expenses 
incurred on Taylor's behalf, pursuant to Utah Code 78-45-7.15. 
16. Respondent shall maintain life insurance on his life in the face amount of at least 
$100,000, naming Taylor the beneficiary thereon, until such time that child support terminates. 
17. The parties shall share equally any work-related child care expenses incurred by 
either party. The party incurring the expense shall provide written verification of the cost and 
identity of the child care provider to the other party upon initial engagement and thereafter upon 
request. 
18. Respondent shall pay to petitioner the sum of $200.00 as his one-half share for the 
day care/pre-school expenses incurred by petitioner during the pendency of this matter. 
19. Respondent shall pay to petitioner the sum of $263.00, which is the interest 
penalty that petitioner incurred in regard to her taxes. 
20. Petitioner is hereby awarded all of the personal property set forth in paragraph 24 
of her Supplemental Proposed Findings of Fact, which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and 
incorporated herein by reference, including one-half of .the videos relating to Taylor. However, 
based upon respondent's representation to the court that he no longer has possession of said 
items of personal property, the burden is on petitioner to show that, in fact, respondent does have 
any such item before respondent would be obligated to return the item to petitioner, except for 
one-half of all the photographs and videos relating to Taylor. 
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21. Petitioner shall be entitled to claim Taylor as a dependent for income tax purposes 
for the year 2001 and each and every odd year thereafter, and respondent shall be entitled to 
claim Taylor as a dependent for income tax purposes for the year 2002 and each and every even 
year thereafter. 
22. In regard to an award of attorney's fees requested by petitioner, petitioner's 
counsel shall provide to the court an affidavit as to all of the attorneys fees that the petitioner has 
incurred, stating in said affidavit the reasonableness and necessity of the attorneys fees incurred. 
Respondent's counsel shall be allowed to respond to the fees affidavit, and the court thereafter 
shall make a determination in regard to awarding any attorneys fees to the petitioner based upon 
the financial need of petitioner, the ability of respondent to pay, and the reasonableness and 
necessity of the fees requested. 
DATED this CS day of J S ^ A V ^ , 2002. 
BY THEjGOtSRT: 
GLENN K. IWASAKI 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
RICHARD S. NEMELKA 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on tWsn_j3ay of April 2002,1 caused a duplicate original of the 
foregoing DECREE OF PATERNITY to be faxed and mailed by United States mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Richard S. Nemelka 
NEMELKA & MANGRUM 
7110 South Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 




30-3-33, Advisory guidelines. 
In addition to the parent-time schedules provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5, 
advisory guidelines are suggested to govern all parent-time arrangements between parents. These 
advisory guidelines include: 
(1) parent-time schedules mutually agreed upon by both parents are preferable to a 
court-imposed solution; 
(2) the parent-time schedule shall be utilized to maximize the continuity and stability of the 
child's life; 
(3) special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the child available to attend 
family functions including funerals, weddings, family reunions, religious holidays, important 
ceremonies, and other significant events in the life of the child or in the life of-either parent 
which may inadvertently conflict with the parent-time schedule: 
(4) the noncustodial parent shall pick up the child at the times specified and return the child 
at the times specified, and the child's regular school hours shall not be interrupted; 
(5) the custodial parent shall have the child ready for parent-time at the time he is to be 
picked up and shall be present at the custodial home or shall make reasonable alternate 
arrangements to receive the child at the time he is returned; 
(6) the court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably accommodate 
the work schedule of both parents and may increase the parent-time allowed to the noncustodial 
parent but shall not diminish the standardized parent-time provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 
30-3-35.5; 
(7) the court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to reasonably accommodate 
the distance between the parties and the expense of exercising parent-time: 
(8) neither parent-time nor child support is to be withheld due to either parent's failure to 
comply with a court-ordered parent-time schedule: 
(9) the custodial parent shall notify the noncustodial parent within 24 hours of receiving 
notice of all significant school, social, sports, and community functions in which the child is 
participating or being honored, and the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to attend and 
participate fully; 
(10) the noncustodial parent shall have access directly to all school reports including 
preschool and daycare reports and medical records and shall be notified immediately by the 
custodial parent in the event of a medical emergency; 
(11) each parent shall provide the other with his current address and telephone number within 
24 hours of any change; 
(12) each parent shall permit and encourage liberal telephone contact during reasonable hours 
and uncensored mail privileges with the child; 
(13) parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than surrogate care and the 
© 200! Matthew Bender & Company. Inc.. a member of the LexisNexis Group AH rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the 
restrictions and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement. 
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court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if willing and 
able, to provide child care; 
(14) each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers with the name, current address, and 
telephone number of the other parent and shall provide the noncustodial parent with the name, 
current address, and telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the coun for good 
cause orders otherwise; and 
(15) each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious holidays celebrated 
by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a religious holiday that the other parent does not 
celebrate shall have the right to be together with the child on the religious holiday. 
History: C 1953,30-3-33, enacted by L. 1993, ch. 131, § 3; 1997, ch. 80, § 1; 2001, ch. 255, § 
9. 
Amendment Notes. - The 1997 amendment effective May 5, 1997, in the introductory paragraph and 
Subsection (6) added "and Section 30-3-35 5," deleted former Subsection (3) concerning the court's 
altering of visitation schedules, and redesignated the other subsections accordingly 
The 2001 amendment effective Apnl 30 2001, substituted "parent-time" for "visitation" and made 
stylistic changes 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Day care. 
Subsection (13) does not entitle a noncustodial parent to provide day care but only suggests that the 
trial court encourage such an arrangement, so that when the trial court finds the noncustodial parent unfit 
to provide such services it has the discretion to deny the noncustodial parent's request to provide day 
care Childs v Childs 96? P 2d 942 (Utah Ct ApD 1998), cert denied, 982 P 2d 88 (Utah 1999) 
C 2001 Matthew Bender 8L Company, Inc . a member of the LexisNexis Group All rights reserved Use of this product is subject to the 
restrictions and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement 
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silverware, silver tea set, coffee table, end table, living roam 
picture floral, two Waterford crystal vases, two large clay Ssh, 
two large pot vases , large Christmas tablecloth with matahing 
glasses and dishes , large flower arrangement and vase irt 
hallway, flower arrangement above bed in large bedroom twoi 
brand new formal dresses, a new negligee, black ski pants , 
and other i tems of Petitioner's personal clothing and effects, 
video tapes and books belonging to the minor child, Patrick, 
together with all of his personal property, clothing and effect^ 
that are still located in Las Vegas, Nevada, including a mckiiig 
horse that w a s made for Patrick by his grandmother. Tike chair 
and stool belonging to Taylor that was a gift to the Petitioner 
by another Flight Attendant, a portrait of Taylor that wpfe 
obtained by the Petitioi^r, one-half of all the photograptis, 
pictures and movies of the minor children which includes vfieos 
of Patrick prior to the birth of Taylor which are still in the 
poaacasiun of Uitr Respondent. 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
DeputKCleriT 
PAIGE BIGELOW (6493) 
KRUSE LANDA MAYCOCK & RICKS, LLC 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
P.O. Box 45561 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0561 
Telephone: (801)531-7090 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHY LENAY HUISH, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
GLEN FRANK MUNRO, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 994907668 PA 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. 
The above-entitled matter was tried to the Court on July 13,14,15, 16,22, August 3, 11, 
2, 19, 24, and September 15. Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Grant W.P. 
Morrison and David Drake, and respondent was present and represented by counsel, Paige 
Bigelow. The Court, having heard the testimony of the witnesses, having reviewed the exhibits 
entered into evidence, having fully considered the evidence picsented and the arguments of 
counsel, and being otherwise full informed in the premises, hereby enters the following Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
Grounds for Modification 
1. A decree of paternity ("Decree") was entered in this case on July 8, 2002. The 
Decree incorporated the parties' stipulation entered on the record September 4, 2001. 
2. In sum and substance, the Decree incorporates the recommendations of Dr. Carol 
Gage, who performed a custody evaluation in this case and submitted a report dated September 
2000 and an updated report dated August 2001. 
3. Dr. Gage's initial report recommended that the parties be awarded joint legal 
custody of their son, Taylor, now age 8, d.o.b. July 11,1996, but noted that the dissention 
between the parties would need to decrease. 
4. In the updated report, Dr. Gage reiterated her initial recommendation, but noted 
that the parties' difficulties had not improved, that the parties' ability to communicate had not 
improved, and that the parties remained unable to effectively communicate. Dr. Gage expressed 
hope that improvements would occur once the Decree was entered and the custody issues were 
resolved. 
5. Dr. Gage's aspirations did not bear out, and the parties' ability to communicate 
did not improve. Dr. Gage testified at trial regarding her hopeful aspirations for the parties, "I 
was wrong." 
7 , 7 ^ 
6. As a result of the parties' ongoing failure of communication, lack of compromise, 
and inability to work together, Taylor has been exposed to high conflict and ongoing dissention 
between the parties. 
7. For the foregoing reasons, the joint custody order in the parties' stipulated Decree 
is unworkable or inappropriate under existing circumstances. In accordance with Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-10.4, the court finds that the joint legal custody order should be dissolved and an 
order of sole legal custody entered. Further, in accordance with the principles set forth in Moody 
v. Moody. 715 P.2d 507 (Utah 1985), and Elmer v. Elmer. 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989), the Court 
finds that the unworkability of the joint custody order constitutes sufficient grounds to modify the 
order. 
8. As an additional ground for modification, after entry of the parties' stipulated 
Decree, petitioner married and began making plans to relocate with the parties' child to 
Kwajalein, an atoll located thousands of miles from the child's primary residence established in 
the Decree, namely, Murray, Utah. Practically speaking, petitioner's intended move, and 
subsequent formal notification of such, precipitated respondent's petition to modify. Petitioner 
did not state her intention not to move to Kwajalein until the Court had taken evidence on the 
first day of trial and expressly requested that she declare her intentions one way or the other, so 
as to remove all ambiguity and to clarify the issues for the Court for the remainder of the trial. 
The Court finds that petitioner's planned relocation during the entire time that the petition to 
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modify was pending constitutes an additional change in circumstance that warrants modifying the 
custody provisions of the parties' Decree. 
Best Interests of the Child 
9. Petitioner and respondent are each good people who possess positive 
characteristics. Petitioner is attractive, engaging and intelligent. Respondent is detail-oriented 
and reliable. However, like oil and water, petitioner and respondent do not mix well together. 
10. The Court does not take lightly its responsibility to craft a custody order that will 
be in Taylor's best interests. Taylor is doing well, though the Court cannot determine whether 
that is in spite of or because of the efforts of one or the other party or both parties. However, it is 
clear that the current custody order has resulted in a high conflict, high stress situation that is not 
good for Taylor and must change for Taylor's best interests. 
11. The Court has considered several factors, including the factors set forth in 
Rule 4-903 of the Code of Judicial Administration, in determining custody. Where no findings 
are made with respect to a particular factor, the Court finds that the factor is not significant or 
weighty in this case. 
12. With respect to the child's preference, the Court finds the evidence to be 
equivocal and, due to the child's young age, does not find this factor to be dispositive in this 
case. 
13. With respect to the preference for keeping siblings together, the Court finds that 
there is an eight-year age difference between Taylor and his half-brother, Patrick, who is 16 years 
old, and that the brothers have different fathers with whom they share time on different 
schedules. Therefore, while it is desirable for Taylor and Patrick to have continued contact with 
one another, and the Court supports the parties' efforts to arrange the boys' parent-time schedule 
to allow for continued contact, it is not necessary for custody of Taylor to be awarded to 
petitioner to this. The Court does not find this factor to be dispositive in this case. 
14. The Court finds that both parties have shown a depth of desire for custody of 
Taylor. 
15. The factors the Court finds to be of most importance in this case are as follows: 
a. Which Parent Is Most Likely To Act In The Best Interest Of The Child, 
Including Allowing The Child Frequent And Continuing Contact With The Noncustodial 
Parent. The Court finds that petitioner has been unwilling to facilitate the joint custody 
order in the parties' stipulated Decree and that she is incapable of encouraging Taylor's 
relationship with respondent. Petitioner has exhibited a great degree of negativity toward 
petitioner. In this regard, the Court notes that many of petitioner's witnesses had a very 
low opinion of respondent, though they had little or no contact with him. Conversely, 
witnesses testifying in support of respondent did not display such negativity toward 
petitioner. Whereas respondent may have his opinion of petitioner, the Court finds that 
he is able to keep it to himself for Taylor's best interests, whereas petitioner is not able to 
do the same. Further, respondent has been and is amenable to Taylor sharing time with 
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petitioner, whereas petitioner is not amenable to Taylor sharing time with respondent and 
attempts to minimize and thwart respondent's contact with Taylor. 
b. Emotional Stability. The Court finds that petitioner is changeable and 
lacks stability. The Court accepts Dr. Monica Christy's testimony, bolstered by her notes 
of interviews with petitioner during the custody evaluation ordered by the Court in this 
modification proceeding, which testimony was adamantly denied by petitioner, that 
petitioner stated she would move to Kwajalein whether or not custody of Taylor were 
awarded to her. Her change of position at trial evidences a high degree of changeability. 
Additionally, petitioner's decision, after a four-month courtship, to marry a man whose 
employment would require her to uproot Taylor from his home and from respondent to 
move thousands of miles away evidences some impulsivity and lack of planning. By 
contrast, respondent is less impulsive, less changeable, and is able to provide more 
stability for Taylor. 
c. Compliance with Court Orders. The Court finds that respondent is more 
apt to abide by court orders than petitioner and to pay attention to and interpret the orders 
correctly. In this regard, the Court notes that petitioner has taken the position that her 
mother, Lenay Russell, was entitled to pick up Taylor from school on January 15, 2003, 
even though petitioner was in Florida and respondent was available to and did pick up 
Taylor. This position is clearly contrary to the provisions of the Decree. This and other 
positions taken by petitioner contrary to the provisions of the Decree have created undue 
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conflict that has adversely affected Taylor. By contrast, respondent has abided by the 
Decree and by the court's orders and has interpreted them correctly, whether he likes the 
them or not. 
16. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that it is in Taylor's best interest for sole 
legal and physical custody of Taylor to be awarded to respondent, subject to petitioner's rights of 
parent-time as set forth hereafter. Transition should take place October 1, 2004. 
17. So long as petitioner maintains her primary residence within the counties of 
Summit, Davis, Tooele, Utah, Salt Lake or Weber, respondent should maintain Taylor's primary 
residence in one of the foregoing counties in the State of Utah. 
18. Commencing October 1, 2004, respondent should enroll Taylor in the public 
school in respondent's Park City neighborhood, or at respondent's option, he should select a 
private school for Taylor that is accessible to both petitioner's and respondent's residences. 
19. Respondent should notify petitioner within 24 hours of receiving notice of all 
significant school, social, sports, and community functions in which Taylor is participating or 
being honored, and petitioner should be entitled to attend and participate fully. 
20. Petitioner should have access directly to all of Taylor's school reports and medical 
records. 
21. The parties should each notify the other immediately in the event of a medical 
emergency involving Taylor. 
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22. The parties should each provide the other with his or her current residential 
address, telephone number and e-mail address within 24 hours of any change. 
23. As sole custodial parent, respondent should have final say in the event the parties 
disagree on any issue pertaining to Taylor, pursuant to all statutory and guideline authority of a 
sole custodial parent. Upon motion, the court may appoint a special master if warranted in the 
future, but the court is not appointing a special master at this time. 
24. Because respondent is an airline pilot and his schedule changes month-to-month, 
the Court will not establish a set parent-time schedule for petitioner. However, the Court urges 
respondent to allow liberal parent-time to petitioner, consisting of total time, including surrogate 
care time and holiday time, of approximately 40 percent during the school year and 50 percent 
during the summer, and to support and encourage the familial bonds that Taylor has with 
petitioner and with petitioner's family. 
25. In the absence of an agreement otherwise between the parties, petitioner's parent-
time with Taylor should take place in accordance with the following provisions: 
a. Regular monthly schedule. Petitioner should be entitled to designate 
three consecutive days per month in the months of September through May and five 
consecutive days per month in the months of June through August as her parent-time. 
This time should be in addition to her surrogate care time set forth hereafter. If a day 
petitioner designates is a school day, the day should commence when school lets out and 
ends the following day when school commences, or if the following day is not a school 
day, at 12 o'clock noon. If a day petitioner designates is not a school day, it should 
commence at 12 o'clock noon and end the following day at 12 o'clock noon, or if the 
following day is a school day, when school commences. On school days, petitioner 
should ensure that Taylor is picked up from and delivered to school in a timely manner, 
and that his homework is completed. 
b. Surrogate care. When respondent is flying or otherwise unavailable to 
care for Taylor for a period exceeding 4 hours, respondent should notify petitioner so that 
she may have the first opportunity to provide surrogate care for Taylor during such times. 
Respondent should notify petitioner when he will be unavailable to care for Taylor as 
soon as he knows of it, and as to those times that he will be flying, he should provide his 
flight schedule for the ensuing month to petitioner by the 18 day of each month. 
Petitioner should notify respondent within 24 hours of receiving notice from him should 
she be unavailable to provide surrogate care for Taylor so that he may make alternate 
arrangements for child care. If petitioner does not notify respondent within 24 hours of 
receiving notice from him that she will be unavailable to provide surrogate care for 
Taylor, then it should be presumed that petitioner will be responsible to provide surrogate 
care for Taylor, and in the event petitioner later declines to do so, she should be 
responsible to pay child care costs incurred by respondent for that time. 
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c. Holiday schedule, 
i. Respondent should be entitled to the following holidays in years 
ending in an even number, and petitioner should be entitled to the following 
holidays in years ending in an odd number: 
1. Taylor's birthday on the day before or after the actual 
birthday beginning at 3:00 p.m. until 9.00 p.m.; 
2. Human Rights day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until 
Monday at 7:00 p.m.; 
3. Spring Break or Easter holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. on 
the day that school lets out for the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the Sunday 
before school resumes; 
4. Memorial Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until 
Monday at 7:00 p.m.; 
5. July 24th beginning at 6:00 p.m. on the day before the 
holiday until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
6. Veterans Day holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before 
the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; and 
7. The first half of the Christmas school vacation (defined as 
the time period beginning on the evening Taylor gets out of school for the 
Christmas break until the evening before he returns to school, except that 
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if Christmas Day marks the halfway point, then the transition should take 
place the following day); 
ii. Respondent should be entitled to the following holidays in years 
ending in an odd number, and petitioner should be entitled to the following 
holidays in years ending in an even number: 
1. Taylor's birthday on the actual birthday beginning at 
3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.; 
2. Presidents' Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until 
7:00 p.m. on Monday; 
3. July 4th beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
4. Labor Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until Monday 
at 7:00 p.m.; 
5. The fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as 
UEA weekend, beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 
7:00 p.m.; 
6. Columbus Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
7. Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7:00 p.m. 
until Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; 
8, The second half of the Christmas school vacation (defined 
as the time period beginning on the evening Taylor gets out of school for 
the Christmas break until the evening before he returns to school, except 
that if Christmas Day marks the halfway point, then the transition should 
take place the following day); 
iii. Respondent should be entitled to Father's Day every year 
beginning at 9:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday. Petitioner should be 
entitled to Mother's Day every year beginning at 9:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the 
holiday. 
iv. The holiday schedule supersedes the regular monthly schedule and 
uninterrupted time. 
d. Uninterrupted time. The parties should each be entitled to two weeks of 
uninterrupted time with Taylor during Taylor's summer break from school. The parties 
should each notify the other of the uninterrupted time he or she plans to take at least 
45 days in advance. Neither party should schedule their uninterrupted time to conflict 
with the other party's holiday time. Uninterrupted time supersedes the regular monthly 
schedule, but does not supersede holiday time. 
e. Family functions. Each party should make Taylor available to attend 
family funerals, family weddings, family reunions, important ceremonies, and events of 
similar significance in the life of the child or the party. Each party should notify the other 
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of any such family function that they would like Taylor to attend as soon as they know of 
it. 
f. Communications. When the child is in his or her custody, the parties 
should each permit and encourage, during reasonable hours, reasonable and uncensored 
communications between the child and the other party, including mail, e-mail, and 
telephone communications. 
g. Transportation. Petitioner should be responsible to pick up Taylor from 
school or respondent's home, whichever is applicable, at the commencement of her 
parent-time or surrogate care time, and respondent should ensure that Taylor is ready to 
go with petitioner. Respondent should be responsible to pick up Taylor from school or 
petitioner's home, whichever is applicable, at the conclusion of petitioner's parent-time 
or surrogate care time, and petitioner should ensure that Taylor is ready to go with 
respondent. On those occasions when respondent is able to drop off Taylor at petitioner's 
home on his way to the airport at the commencement of petitioner's parent-time or 
surrogate care time, he should notify petitioner and she should ensure that she or her 
mother is home to receive Taylor at the time designated. 
26. Until such time as petitioner notifies respondent in writing of an alternate e-mail 
address, respondent should be deemed to have met notification requirements set forth herein 
upon e-mailing the required notice to petitioner at the following address: 
kathylsawyer@msn.com. Until such time as respondent notifies petitioner in writing of an 
alternate e-mail address, petitioner should be deemed to have met notification requirements set 
forth herein upon e-mailing the required notice to respondent at the following address: 
megadogdriver(g)/peoplepc.com. The parties are not restricted to e-mail communication and may 
communicate with one another by telephone, in person, or by any other method that works for 
them; however, notifications should be in writing and e-mailed to the other party. Both parties 
should take care to restrict their communications to matters pertaining to Taylor, and should 
refrain from making uncivil or derogatory comments to one another. 
27. Petitioner is currently on a voluntary leave of absence from Delta Air Lines, 
where she is employed as a flight attendant. She was earning $41, 630 per year, or $3,469 per 
month, before taking her voluntary leave commencing January 2003. She has stipulated to 
income being imputed to her in this amount. For purposes of calculating child support and 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(6) & (7), the Court finds that petitioner's gross monthly 
income is $3,469. 
28. Respondent is employed as an airline pilot for Delta Air Lines. His annual gross 
income has been $197,680, or $16,473 per month. It is expected that he will be taking a 
significant pay cut within the near future due to Delta Air Lines' threatened bankruptcy. 
However, the Court is unable to determine at this point what respondent's income will be after 
the pay cut and therefore declines to make such findings. Respondent may petition the court to 
modify child support, if appropriate, when the amount of his pay cut is known. For purposes of 
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calculating child support, the Court finds that respondent's gross monthly income is $16,473 per 
month. 
29. The Court anticipates that, between petitioner's parent-time and surrogate care, 
Taylor will spend approximately 40 percent of his time with petitioner, or 146 overnights per 
year. Therefore, the joint physical custody worksheet should be used to calculate child support, 
setting the number of overnights with petitioner at 146 and the number of overnights with 
respondent at 219. The Court emphasizes that the use of the joint physical custody worksheet is 
for child support purposes only, and should not be deemed to equate to an award of joint physical 
custody to petitioner. The Court reiterates that, in accordance with Taylor's best interests, 
respondent should be awarded sole legal and physical custody of Taylor. 
30. Based on the parties' incomes and the foregoing time distribution, commencing 
October 1, 2004, respondent should pay base child support to petitioner in the amount of $9 per 
month, as set forth on the child support obligation worksheet attached hereto as Exhibit "A". In 
the event petitioner does not provide surrogate care for Taylor as anticipated, base child support 
may be modified. 
31. Respondent should maintain health insurance for Taylor as long as the same is 
available to him at reasonable cost, and each party should pay one-half of Taylor's portion of the 
premium for said insurance. Commencing January 1, 2005, said amount will be $115 per month 
and petitioner's one-half share will be $58 per month, for a total child support obligation owing 
from petitioner to respondent in the amount of $49 per month, calculated pursuant to the 
insurance adjustment worksheet attached hereto. If petitioner is able to obtain equivalent or 
superior health insurance coverage for Taylor for a lower monthly premium, she should have the 
option of doing so. If petitioner is able to obtain such coverage for Taylor, she should provide 
verification thereof to respondent, whereupon respondent's share of the coverage maintained by 
petitioner should be offset against the amount petitioner owes to respondent for her share of the 
coverage maintained by respondent. 
32. The parties should each pay one-half of all uninsured medical expenses incurred 
for Taylor, including co-pays and deductibles. Medical expenses should be understood to 
include, but not be limited to, dental, orthodontic, optometric, ophthalmologic, and mental health 
expenses. The party incurring the expense should provide verification thereof within 30 days of 
payment, and the other party should pay his or her one-half share within 30 days thereafter. 
33. Except as set forth in paragraph 25.b. above, petitioner should pay one-half of the 
work-related child care expenses incurred by respondent for Taylor. Respondent should provide 
written verification of the cost and identity of the child care provider to petitioner upon initial 
engagement and thereafter upon request. 
34. So long as petitioner is current in her total child support obligation as set forth in 
paragraph 28 above by December 31, petitioner should be entitled to claim Taylor as a dependent 
for income tax purposes in odd-numbered years. Petitioner should not be entitled to claim the 
dependency exemption in any year she is not current in her child support obligation. Respondent 
should be entitled to claim Taylor as a dependent for income tax purposes in even-numbered 
years and any year that petitioner is not entitled to claim it. In any year that either party is 
substantially unemployed or otherwise cannot benefit from claiming the dependency exemption, 
without consideration of any subsequent spouses' income, the other party should be entitled to 
claim the dependency exemption for that year. 
35. It is fair and equitable for the petitioner to pay one-third and for respondent to pay 
two-thirds of the cost of the custody evaluation ordered by the court to be performed by Dr. 
Monica Christy in this modification proceeding, including Dr. Christy's trial fees. Because 
respondent has already advanced the entire fee to Dr. Christy, petitioner should pay her one-third 
share directly to respondent. Said payment should be made in full within 60 days of the entry of 
these Findings and Conclusions and the Order Modifying the Decree of Paternity. 
36. The parties' decree of paternity does not allocate responsibility between the 
parties for payment of the 2000-2001 custody evaluation performed by Dr. Carol Gage. The 
overall cost of that evaluation was approximately $8,500, of which respondent has paid $7,100. 
It is fair and equitable for petitioner to be responsible for the remaining balance owed, if any, 
which she should pay directly to Dr. Gage. 
37. It is fair and equitable for petitioner to be responsible for her own attorney fees 
incurred in the protracted litigation that has ensued between the parties since entry of the Decree 
of Paternity. 
fpPrD'^ 
Based upon the preceding Findings of Fact, the Court now enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. An order modifying the parties' Decree of Paternity should enter herein and 
should supersede the Decree of Paternity. 
2. Said order should award custody and parent-time and allocate financial 
obligations between the parties as set forth in the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
U day of /tfktL DATED this 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
/wfe/to^' 
GRANT W.P. MORRISON 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
GLENN K. IWASAKI 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this | day of April, 2005,1 caused a duplicate original of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be mailed by United 
States mail, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
Grant W.P. Morrison 
David 0. Drake 
MORRISON & MORRISON, LC 
352 East 900 South 





PAIGE BIGELOW (6493) 
KRUSE LANDA MAYCOCK & RICKS, LLC 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
P. O. Box 45561 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0561 
Telephone: (801) 531-7090 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHY LENAY HUISH, ; 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
GLEN FRANK MUNRO, ; 
Respondent. ] 
ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF 
) PATERNITY 
) Civil No. 994907668 PA 
) Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. 
The above-entitled matter was tried to the Court on July 13, 14, 15, 16, 22, August 3, 11, 
2, 19, 24, and September 15. Petitioner was present and represented by counsel, Grant W.P. 
Morrison and David Drake, and respondent was present and represented by counsel, Paige 
Bigelow. The Court, having heard the testimony of the witnesses, having reviewed the exhibits 
entered into evidence, having fully considered the evidence presented and the arguments of 
counsel, and having previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
1. The parties' Decree of Paternity is hereby modified and superseded by this Order. 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
By S^» 
<^&LT LAKE COUNT\j 
Deputy\C!erk 
JD16973794 
994907668 MUNRO,GLEN FRANK 
2. Sole legal and physical custody of Taylor is awarded to respondent, subject to 
petitioner's rights of parent-time as set forth hereafter. Transition shall take place October 1, 
2004. 
3. So long as petitioner maintains her primary residence within the counties of 
Summit, Davis, Toeele, Utah, Salt Lake or Weber, respondent shall maintain Taylor's primary 
residence in one of the foregoing counties in the State of Utah. 
4. Commencing October 1, 2004, respondent shall enroll Taylor in the public school 
in respondent's Park City neighborhood, or at respondent's option, he may select a private school 
for Taylor that is accessible to both petitioner's and respondent's residences. 
5. Respondent shall notify petitioner within 24 hours of receiving notice of all 
significant school, social, sports, and community functions in which Taylor is participating or 
being honored, and petitioner shall be entitled to attend and participate fully. 
6. Petitioner shall have access directly to all of Taylor's school reports and medical 
records. 
7. The parties shall each notify the other immediately in the event of a medical 
emergency involving Taylor. 
8. The parties shall each provide the other with his or her current residential address, 
telephone number and e-mail address within 24 hours of any change. 
9. As sole custodial parent, respondent shall have final say in the event the parties 
disagree on any issue pertaining to Taylor, pursuant to all statutory and guideline authority of a 
2
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sole custodial parent. Upon motion, the court may appoint a special master if warranted in the 
future, but the court is not appointing a special master at this time. 
10. Because respondent is an airline pilot and his schedule changes month-to-month, 
the Court will not establish a set parent-time schedule for petitioner. However, the Court urges 
respondent to allow liberal parent-time to petitioner, consisting of total time, including surrogate 
care time and holiday time, of approximately 40 percent during the school year and 
approximately 50 percent during the summer, and to support and encourage the familial bonds 
that Taylor has with petitioner and with petitioner's family. 
11. In the absence of an agreement otherwise between the parties, petitioner's parent-
time with Taylor shall take place in accordance with the following provisions: 
a. Regular monthly schedule. Petitioner shall be entitled to designate 
three consecutive days per month in the months of September through May and five 
consecutive days per month in the months of June through August as her parent-time. 
This time shall be in addition to her surrogate care time set forth hereafter. If a day 
petitioner designates is a school day, it shall commence when school lets out and end the 
following day when school commences, or if the following day is not a school day, at 12 
o'clock noon. If a day petitioner designates is not a school day, it shall commence at 12 
o'clock noon and end the following day at 12 o'clock noon, or if the following day is a 
school day, when school commences. On school days, petitioner shall ensure that Taylor 
is picked up from and delivered to school in a timely manner, and that his homework is 
completed. 
b. Surrogate care. When respondent is flying or otherwise unavailable to 
care for Taylor for a period exceeding 4 hours, respondent shall notify petitioner so that 
she may have the first opportunity to provide surrogate care for Taylor during such times. 
Respondent shall notify petitioner when he will be unavailable to care for Taylor as soon 
as he knows of it, and as to those times that he will be flying, he shall provide his flight 
schedule for the ensuing month to petitioner by the 18th day of each month. Petitioner 
shall notify respondent within 24 hours of receiving notice from him should she be 
unavailable to provide surrogate care for Taylor so that he may make alternate 
arrangements for child care. If petitioner does not notify respondent within 24 hours of 
receiving notice from him that she will be unavailable to provide surrogate care for 
Taylor, then it shall be presumed that petitioner will be responsible to provide surrogate 
care for Taylor, and in the event petitioner later declines to do so, she shall be responsible 
to pay child care costs incurred by respondent for that time. 
c. Holiday schedule. 
i. Respondent shall be entitled to the following holidays in years 
ending in an even number, and petitioner shall be entitled to the following 
holidays in years ending in an odd number: 
1. Taylor's birthday on the day before or after the actual 
birthday beginning at 3:00 p.m. until 9.00 p.m.; 
2. Human Rights day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until 
Monday at 7:00 p.m.; 
3. Spring Break or Easter holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. on 
the day that school lets out for the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the Sunday 
before school resumes; 
4. Memorial Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until 
Monday at 7:00 p.m.; 
5. July 24th beginning at 6:00 p.m. on the day before the 
holiday until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
6. Veterans Day holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before 
the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; and 
7. The first half of the Christmas school vacation (defined as 
the time period beginning on the evening Taylor gets out of school for the 
Christmas break until the evening before he returns to school, except that 
if Christmas Day markes the halfway point, then the transition shall take 
place the following day); 
~t4\D 
ii. Respondent shall be entitled to the following holidays in years 
ending in an odd number, and petitioner shall be entitled to the following holidays 
in years ending in an even number: 
1. Taylor's birthday on the actual birthday beginning at 
3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.; 
2. Presidents' Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until 
7:00 p.m. on Monday; 
3. July 4th beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
4. Labor Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until Monday 
at 7:00 p.m.; 
5. The fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as 
UEA weekend, beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 
7:00 p.m.; 
6. Columbus Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
7. Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7:00 p.m. 
until Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; 
8. The second half of the Christmas school vacation (defined 
as the time period beginning on the evening Taylor gets out of school for 
the Christmas break until the evening before he returns to school, except 
that if Christmas Day marks the halfway point, then the transition should 
take place the following day); 
iii. Respondent shall be entitled to Father's Day every year beginning 
at 9:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday. Petitioner shall be entitled to Mother's 
Day every year beginning at 9:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday. 
iv. The holiday schedule supersedes the regular monthly schedule and 
uninterrupted time. 
d. Uninterrupted time. The parties shall each be entitled to two weeks of 
uninterrupted time with Taylor during Taylor's summer break from school. The parties 
shall each notify the other of the uninterrupted time he or she plans to take at least 
45 days in advance. Neither party shall schedule their uninterrupted time to conflict with 
the other party's holiday time. Uninterrupted time supersedes the regular monthly 
schedule, but does not supersede holiday time. 
e. Family functions. Each party shall make Taylor available to attend family 
funerals, family weddings, family reunions, important ceremonies, and events of similar 
significance in the life of the child or the party. Each party shall notify the other of any 
such family function that they would like Taylor to attend as soon as they know of it. 
f. Communications. When the child is in his or her custody, the parties shall 
each permit and encourage, during reasonable hours, reasonable and uncensored 
communications between the child and the other party, including mail, e-mail, and 
telephone communications. 
g. Transportation. Petitioner shall be responsible to pick up Taylor from 
school or respondent's home, whichever is applicable, at the commencement of her 
parent-time or surrogate care time, and respondent shall ensure that Taylor is ready to go 
with petitioner. Respondent shall be responsible to pick up Taylor from school or 
petitioner's home, whichever is applicable, at the conclusion of petitioner's parent-time 
or surrogate care time, and petitioner shall ensure that Taylor is ready to go with 
respondent. On those occasions when respondent is able to drop off Taylor at petitioner's 
home on his way to the airport at the commencement of petitioner's parent-time or 
surrogate care time, he shall notify petitioner and petitioner shall ensure that either she or 
her mother is home to receive Taylor at the time designated. 
12. Until such time as petitioner notifies respondent in writing of an alternate e-mail 
address, respondent shall be deemed to have met notification requirements set forth herein upon 
e-mailing the required notice to petitioner at the following address: kathylsawyer@msn.com. 
Until such time as respondent notifies petitioner in writing of an alternate e-mail address, 
petitioner shall be deemed to have met notification requirements set forth herein upon e-mailing 
the required notice to respondent at the following address: megadogdriver@peoplepc.com. The 
parties are not restricted to e-mail communication and may communicate with one another by 
telephone, in person, or by any other method that works for them; however, notifications shall be 
made in writing and e-mailed to the other party. Both parties shall restrict their communications 
to matters pertaining to Taylor, and shall refrain from making uncivil or derogatory comments to 
one another. 
13. Respondent shall pay base child support to petitioner in the amount of $9 per 
month, calculated in accordance with the joint custody worksheet attached hereto as Exhibit "A" 
and based on income imputed to petitioner in the amount of $3,469 per month, income to 
respondent in the amount of $16,473 per month, and Taylor spending approximately 40 percent 
of his time with petitioner - between petitioner's parent-time and surrogate care - or 146 
overnights per year. In the event petitioner does not provide surrogate care for Taylor as 
anticipated, base child support may be modified. 
14. Respondent shall maintain health insurance for Taylor as long as the same is 
available to him at reasonable cost, and each party shall pay one-half of Taylor's portion of the 
premium for said insurance. Commencing January 1, 2005, said amount will be $115 per month 
and petitioner's one-half share will be $58 per month, for a total child support obligation owing 
from petitioner to respondent in the amount of $49 per month, calculated pursuant to the 
insurance adjustment worksheet attached hereto as Exhibit "A". If petitioner is able to obtain 
equivalent or superior health insurance coverage for Taylor for a lower monthly premium, she 
shall have the option of doing so. If petitioner is able to obtain such coverage for Taylor, she 
shall provide verification thereof to respondent, whereupon respondent' share of the coverage 
maintained by petitioner shall be offset against the amount petitioner owes to respondent for her 
share of the coverage maintained by respondent. 
15. The parties shall each pay one-half of all uninsured medical expenses incurred for 
Taylor, including co-pays and deductibles. Medical expenses shall be understood to include, but 
not be limited to, dental, orthodontic, optometric, ophthalmologic, and mental health expenses. 
The party incurring the expense shall provide verification thereof within 30 days of payment, and 
the other party shall pay his or her one-half share within 30 days thereafter. 
16. Except as set forth in paragraph 11 .b. above, petitioner shall pay one-half of the 
work-related child care expenses incurred by respondent for Taylor. Respondent shall provide 
written verification of the cost and identity of the child care provider to petitioner upon initial 
engagement and thereafter upon request. 
17. So long as petitioner is current in her total child support obligation as set forth in 
paragraph 28 above by December 31, petitioner shall be entitled to claim Taylor as a dependent 
for income tax purposes in odd-numbered years. Petitioner shall not be entitled to claim the 
dependency exemption in any year she is not current in her child support obligation. Respondent 
shall be entitled to claim Taylor as a dependent for income tax purposes in even-numbered years 
and any year that petitioner is not entitled to claim it. In any year that either party is substantially 
unemployed or otherwise cannot benefit from claiming the dependency exemption, without 
consideration of any subsequent spouses' income, the other party shall be entitled to claim the 
dependency exemption for that year. 
18. Petitioner shall pay one-third and respondent shall pay two-thirds of the cost of 
the custody evaluation ordered by the court to be performed by Dr. Monica Christy in this 
modification proceeding, including Dr. Christy's trial fees. Because respondent has already 
advanced the entire fee to Dr. Christy, petitioner shall pay her one-third share directly to 
respondent. Said payment shall be made in full within 60 days of the entry of this Order. 
19. The parties' decree of paternity does not allocate responsibility between the 
parties for payment of the 2000-2001 custody evaluation performed by Dr. Carol Gage. The 
overall cost of that evaluation was approximately $8,500, of which respondent has paid $7,100. 
Petitioner shall pay the remaining balance owed, if any, directly to Dr. Gage. 
20. The parties shall each be solely responsible for their own attorney fees incurred in 
this modification proceeding. 
DATED this / / day of /fallt ,2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this j day of April, 2005,1 caused a duplicate original of the 
foregoing ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF PATERNITY to be mailed by United States 
mail, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
Grant W.P. Morrison 
David O. Drake 
MORRISON & MORRISON, LC 
352 East 900 South 




KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C. 
EIGHTH FLOOR, BANK ONE TOWER 
50 WEST BROADWAY (300 SOUTH) 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101-2034 
JAMES R KRUSE 
ELLEN MAYCOCK 
DAVID R KING MAILING ADDRESS 
LYNDON L RICKS Post Office Box 45561 
JODY L WILLIAMS Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0561 
STEVEN G LOOSLE 
RICHARD C TAGGART 
PAIGE BIGELOW 
KEVIN TIMKEN 
KRISTIN L ZIMMERMAN 
May 7, 2001 
VIA FACSIMILE & U.S. MAIL 
Richard S. Nemelka, Esq. 
NEMELKA & MANGRUM 
7110 South Highland Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Fax No: 943-4744 
RE: Huish v. Munro 
Dear Dick: 
I have telephoned you several times since the hearing on Wednesday May 2, but I have 
been unable to connect with you. With respect to Commissioner Arnett's sua sponte 
appointment of Valerie Hale as special master in this case, you need to be aware that we had 
recently contacted Dr. Hale to be an expert witness regarding custody. We have disclosed this on 
our interrogatory responses so I am assuming that you were aware of it. Our involvement with 
Dr. Hale has not been extensive, but she indicates that she has spoken with Dr. Gage and with 
Dr. Davies. She has not spoken with Glen. She has spoken with me two or three times. Please 
advise at once whether you will object to Dr. Hale acting as special master based on this 
disclosure. 
Because we do not have an agreed upon access schedule for May, I believe it is 
imperative that a decision be made quickly regarding who will be acting as special master, so 
that the May access schedule can be established by that individual. Therefore, I am asking that 
you respond affirmatively stating you or your client's objection, if any, on or before Wednesday 
May 9. If I hear nothing from you, I will assume that there is no objection and will prepare the 
order accordingly and forward it to Dr. Hale, together with the information that she needs to 
prepare the May schedule. 
TELEPHONE (801) 531 -7090 
TELECOPY (801) 531-7091 
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KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C. 
May 7, 2001 
Page 2 
I would like to state my personal belief that Dr. Hale could be a very beneficial asset to 
these parties in helping them work through conflict and act in Taylor's best interest. It would 
appear that Commissioner Arnett shares this belief. 
Very truly yours, 
Paige Bigelow 
PB:ta 
cc: Glen Munro 
Tab 5 
miism Valerie Hale, PLO. 
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST 
June 13,2001 
Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett 
450 South State 
P.O. Box 1860 
SLC,UT 84114-1860 
RE: Case #994907668 Huish v. Munro 
Dear Commissioner Arnett, 
I have received the Court's Order that appoints me as Special Master in the 
aforementioned matter. I wanted to clarify my status in this case. 
I was contacted by Paige Bigelow on April 6, 2001 to provide an opinion about the 
Custody Evaluation performed by Carol Gage in August of 2000. 
I have never interviewed either parent, but have spoken with both attorneys. 
I feel prepared to serve as Special Master in this case, as long as all parties are aware that 
I was initially contacted by Ms. Bigelow to review the Custody Evaluation. 
Sincerely, 
Valerie Hale, Ph.D. 
Clinical Psychologist 
VH/dap 
CC: Paige Bigelow 
Richard Nemelka 
1405 EAST 2100 SOUTH • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84105 • 801-485-0400 • FAX 801-485-5525 
Tab 6 
Vntcne Hale, Ph.D. Special Master Services Procedures Agreement 
1/1/2001 
Page 1 
Special Master Services Procedures Agreement 
Valerie Hale, Ph.D. 
Carefully read the entire document and write your initials in the space to the left of each of the items to 
affirm that you have read, understood, and agree to the conditions of the agreement Signing this document 
confirms that you and your attorney understand my policies as well as my expectations for you. 
1. f^Jl This agreement is between Valeric Hale, Ph.D. and ^J^jO^jyijaJ ^(parent). 
2.;rffi^ I have read the information sheet: Special Master Information Sheet provided to me by Dr. 
Hale. 
imfly. T 
I understand that Dr. Hale will usually begin by gathering information about me and about my 
fa i his will usually consist of the following steps: 
Interviews of parents, including stepparents, alone. 
Interviews of children without parents present (usually for children three and older). 
Review of any and all custody, visitation or psychological evaluations 
Review of all medical, psychiatric and other records for all parties. 
Review of available court documents including pleadings, depositions and answers to 
interrogatories, as well as other available records. 
4
 V / ^ " I understand that in the course of working with Dr. Hale as the Special Master, she may determine 
that the following is needed: 
Interviews with teachers, therapists, physicians, neighbors, employers, friends or others. 
Department of Family Services involvement m the case. 
Random drug and alcohol testing of one or both parents. 
Referral to another professional for specialized testing if this information is needed and if 
Dr, Hale is unable to obtain it herself. This could include neuropsychological or 
psychosexual testing (elaborated in #15 below). 
5 . y r p ^ I understand that Dr. Hale will be following a court order which determines her specific authority. 
I understand that it is usual for her decisions to be as effective as court orders when made until she is 
excused by the judge from serving in the position as Special Master. 
6. /Srm_ I understand that Dr. Hale reports directly to the Court, but also communicates with all attorneys, 
cvaluators, therapists and other professionals involved. 
7. / ^ £ ? understand that there is no confidentiality guarantee for any party obtaining Special Master 
services. I know that all information discovered by the Special Master, including her assessment of the 
parties' behavior and situation, will be reported to the court as we]] as tQ other professionals involved in this 
matter and will ultimately be used in determining the child(rcn)'s best interests in the context of the Special 
Master role. 
8 - y ^ S : I understand that I must immediately sign release forms that will allow other professionals to 
communicate with Dr. Hale. These professionals include attorneys, custody and/or visitation cvaluators, 
psychotherapists, physicians, social workers, teachers, school officials, law enforcement agencies and others 
who would require a written release before divulging information about me or my child(ren) to Dr. Haic. 
I understand that by signing this agreement, I give Dr. Hale permission to communicate 
i^nformation to the attorneys, the other parties in the litigation ond to other professionals who have a need to 
know, for as long as she deems necessary. 
Valeric Hale, Pli.D. Spuuul Master Seiviet* l^ roceduics Agi cement 
1/1/2001 
I'ngc 2 
10 Ajfir^ understand that I must agree to provide all documents icquested by Dr. Hale, including but noi 
hnuteoto the following: medical records, psychological records, previous psychological evaluations, school 
records, court documents, police reports, criminal background check, letters, diaries, journals, police repons 
or court papers I understand that any document, tape or video recordings or other materials I submit will 
not be returned and so may provide copies of these materials if needed. 
1 l.JSpfii understand that Dr. Hale will not review illegally obtained information, no matter how important 
it is to my case. If I have a question about submitting something for Dr. Hale's review, I will consult my 
attorney. 
12. V ^ r f I understand that Dr. Hale may consult with other professionals about the content of my case if 
she"sees fit to do so. 
1 3 , / £ 5 ^ I understand that it is important for me to keep my scheduled appointments and that missed 
appointments could be interpreted as a sign that I am being uncooperative. I understand that true 
emergencies which make it impossible for me to attend my appointment or to cancel in a timely manner 
need to be clarified as soon as possible with Dr, Hale. I understand that issues of transportation, work 
schedule, day care difficulties and the like are not consideied emergencies 
14 Kp4r I understand that all allegations of abuse, neglect or substance use/abuse will be taken seriously 
ancf investigated. I also understand that false allegations reflect poorly on the person who made them and 
may impact Dr Hale's decisions made about my case. 
15. J^JFrl understand that Dr. Hale reserves the right to request additional testing if she requu'es 
information that is presently unavailable, and/or outside of her scope of practice to obtain This includes 
but is not limited to the nghr to request random drug and alcohol testing, neuropsychological testing, 
psychosexuai testing, educational and intelligence testing and medical evaluation. The decision to 
implement additional testing if needed is at Di. Hale's discretion. The party responsible for the Special 
Master costs will pay the costs of such additional testing. Payments of these costs are to be remitted 
directly to the consulting professional. 
\6.jr^?fr I understand that Di Hale does not release lau test data that she has gathered, or that she 
possesses, to persons who tire unqualified to interpret it, as directed by the American Psychological 
Association Ethical Code. Therefore, if such information is requested, I agree to allow Dr. Hale to release 
any such specified data to another psychologist or other qualified professional, and not directly to me or to 
my attorney, 
17. /l?r* 1 understand that Dr. Hale must have access to all immediate family members (the children and 
their parents) for as snany interview and consultation sessions as she deems necessary. I understand that 
appointments with Dr. Hale take precedence over any established visitation schedule with the children that 
is in place, although Dr. Hale will make efforts to accommodate such a schedule if possible. 
18. / f ^ n understand that Dr. Hale must be free to contact parties outside the litigation, such as clergy, 
friends, family members, neighbors, employers or others who may have useful information. I give 
permission for such contact to take place 
19.J6jfi^l understand that Dr Hale's role as the Special Master is very specific and is outlined by my 
courrorder which I have attached. I have discussed Dr Hale's duties and limitations of authority with my 
attorney. I understand that Dr. Hale is not a judge, a custody evaluator, a thciapist or a mediator Inbtead, I 
understand that Dr. Hale is the person selected by the Court to make specific decisions relating to my case 




M/£<&rl understand that Dr. Hale will determine the frequency and duration of all Special Master 
counseling appointments, i also understand that while the scheduling of appointment times is not flexible 
although Dr. Hale will make efforts to accommodate my schedule when possible. 
2 1 - ^ r T 1 understand that if Dr. Hale determines that she cannot continue to serve as the Special Master 
for any reason, she will ask the Court to release her from her appointment and will continue to be held 




 u^crstand the Special Master Financial Agreement provided by Dr. Hale and have signed 
this\agreernent. 
23- JXSL^ understand that the case will be charged for missed appointments and late cancellations as 
outlined m the financial Agreement. I understand that disagreements about which parent is financially 
responsible for a missed appointment and other conflicts are to be settled by the court and wiH not be 
addressed by Dr. Hale's office. 
:
 l
 understand that the first S1000.Q0 of the retainer paid to Dr Hale is to be used for Special 
• work and that $500.00 will be retained for emergency contacts and the like. If the first 51000.00 has 
been used, I must pay for additional appointments immediately. I understand that no appointments will be 
made and the case will not progress unless the monthly balance is kept at zero, i also understand non-
payment thai delays the Special Master process will be reported to the Court. 
I understand that in the event of a deposition or trial, prior to Dr. Hale's providing information 
earing at a deposition or at court, all outstanding charges must be paid, and appropriate expert 
witness few must be paid in advance as outlined in the Special Master Services Financial Agreement. 
I understand that the goal of using a Special Master is to manage many of the day to day affairs 
legal case as it pertains to the children in general and to Dr. Hale's duties outlined in my court order 
in particular. I understand that when an issue arises, Dr. Hale will make every effort to schedule an 
appointment as soon as possible. 1 also understand that any difficulty I am having does not necessarily 
constitute a true emergency. I understand that this means that I will have to cope with the situation until my 
appointment with Dr. Hale. 1 understand that if the children or 1 am in danger, I will contact emergency 
services via 911 (e.g. police, fire, etc.) immediately. I also understand that I am to report any suspected 
child abuse to the Utah Department of Family Services, unless instructed by the court to refrain from doing 
reporting such. In sum, 1 understand that while Dr. Hale has been appointed to work closely with my case, 
she is not to h£ considered a crisis service or used as such on a regular basis. 
I understand that once begun, Special Master services can continue for an unspecified period of 
r ± i » i — . ...... M I — i . -
. understand that my attorney will seek clarification from the court as to the date or conditions that 
would denote the end of her services. I understand that there may be times when Special Master services 
are not needed and when I do not have a need to consult the Special Master for a period of a few weeks or 
even mom 
Tf* I understand that throughout the use of Special Master services, Dr. Hale will communicate 
ttly to the commissioner and judge. She wijl also communicate with all attorneys and other 
professionals involved in this case. I understand that she may choose not to disclose information directly to 
me that myohildren provide to her in confidence. 
297S/JL I understand that the Court has appointed Dr. Hale to the Special Master position. I understand 
she will be acting pursuant to a delegation of power by the Court. I agree to use her services within the 
spirit of this appointment. 
1/1/2001 
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—r ^r%k.u* iin«*ici JCIVJCU^ rroccciures Agreement 
I have read the above, discussed all of the provisions with my attorney, and I agree to utilize Special Master 
services under these conditions. 
Date i*~ Signature of attorney 
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